Nozick Essays - Deontological Ethics, American Philosophers

Nozick According to Nozick there are three sets of rules of justice, defining: 1. how things not previously possessed by anyone may be acquired; 2. how possession may be transferred from one person to another; and 3. what must be done to rectify injustices arising from violations of (1) and (2). A distribution is just if it has arisen in accordance with these three sets of rules. See pp. 151-2. Nozick does not try to specify in detail the rules under the above three headings ('I shall not attempt that task here', p. 153). However, he does give some further information on rules of acquisition; see p. 174ff. He follows John Locke who as Nozick interprets him held that a person has a right (1) to own what he makes, and (2) to appropriate anything not already owned, provided he leaves 'enough and as good' for others - i.e. provided his appropriation leaves them no worse off. (Nozick calls this the 'Lockean proviso'.) It is not clear how Nozick would defend (1) against his own criticisms of Locke (p. 174-5). As for (2), he points out that the proviso cannot reasonably be taken to mean that there can be no worsening of others' opportunities to appropriate; it must mean that in other respects they are no worse off. Nozick raises the question 'No worse than they would be how?' What is the baseline? In Rawls's theory the representative worst-off person must be no worse off than he would be under any other possible arrangement. Nozick rejects this, but does not define another baseline: 'This question of fixing a baseline needs more detailed investigation that we are able to give it here'; p. 177. However, 'whether or not Locke's particular theory of appropriation can be spelled out so as to handle various difficulties, I assume that any adequate theory of Justice in acquisition will contain a proviso similar to the weaker of the ones we have attributed to Locke'; p. 178. Nozick says that the proviso is violated if a person appropriates all of something necessary to life - or purchases it, or combines with the other owners of it, or finds himself the sole owner when other supplies are lost (e.g. when all the other water holes dry up). Nozick refers to the possibility of losing entitlement to something that was originally yours because of developments since, such as the drying up of other waterholes, as the 'historical shadow' of the Lockean proviso; p. 180. Comparison with Rawls's Theory Nozick classifies theories of justice as (1) either end-result or historical, and (2) either patterned or unpatterned. The entitlement theory is historical and unpatterned. It does not demand that the distribution resulting from just acquisitions, transfers and rectifications be patterned, i.e. correlated with anything else (such as moral merit, need, usefulness to society); people may be entitled to things got by chance or gift. Any distribution, irrespective of any pattern it may or may not have, is just provided it has the appropriate history, provided it did in fact come about in accordance with the rules of acquisition, transfer and rectification. Rawls's theory on the other hand, is an end-result theory. Choice of principles behind a 'veil of ignorance', must be based on calculations about what people are likely to end up with under the various possible sets of principles - there is no other way of choosing (is there?); p. 202. Therefore if any historical entitlement theory is correct, Rawls's approach is wrong. Notice that this imposes on Rawls in the job of showing that no possible version of an historical entitlement theory could be correct. He might reply that he intends to stick to his own theory until someone actually produces a correct entitlement theory; Nozick has not, because his theory is merely a sketch with many important details not worked out. Nozick points out (p. 207 ff) an analogy between his own entitlement theory and the process by which in Rawls's theory the rules of justice are arrived at. Rawls specifies an initial situation and a process of deliberation, and say that whatever rules results from this are the rules of justice; similarly Nozick specifies a process, and says that whatever distribution results is just. 'Each theory specifies starting points and processes of transformation, and each accepts whatever comes out'. But Rawls's process for generating principles cannot generate process principles, but only end-result principles. Nozick says that this is ironic. It presents a dilemma: if processes are 'so great', it is a defect that the process cannot lead to process principles of justice; if processes are